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SOME PHASES OF THE EXEMPTION LAWS
By LYMAN P. WELD, President, Boulder County Bar
Association
HE General Assembly shall pass liberal homestead and
Colorado Constitution, Article
laws."
exemption
XVIII,
Section 1.
This has been done, the bulk of the exemption laws pertaining to personal property appear in sections 5913-5923,
C. L. Colo. 1921.
However, no statutory method, except to a limited extent, has been provided whereby the debtor whose property
has been seized can make claim for his exemption. Referring
to this subject, our Supreme Court has said: "Our statutes are
silent on the subject." Blum vs. Kasnik, 10 Pac. (2nd) 384.
But by statute a debtor whose property is seized under writ of
attachment issued out of the Justice Court may make claim of
exemption before the Justice of the Peace. Sections 61076108, C. L. Colo. 1921. Such claim may be made orally.
Bassett vs. Inman, 7 Colo. 270; 3 Pac. 383.
Certainly in fairness and justice to a debtor a plain,
simple method should be provided by statute whereby the
debtor may make claim of exemption to property seized
which he may claim to be exempt, and have the issue tried
immediately.
While sections 6107-6108, C. L. Colo. 1921, provide a
debtor may, in cases of writ of attachment issued out of a
Justice Court, make claim of exemption to property in such
court, he is not obligated to do so, but may make demand for
its return and if not returned wait until the property is sold
and then bring suit for treble damages. Collard vs. Hohnstein, 64 Colo. 478; 174 Pac. 596.
"If any officer or other person, by virtue of any execution or other process, or by any right of distress, shall take or
seize any of the articles of property hereinbefore exempted
from levy and sale, such officer or person shall be liable to the
party injured for three times the value of the property illegally taken or seized, to be recovered by action of trespass,
with costs of suit." Section 5921, C. L. Colo. 1921.
The application of this particular statute has resulted in
considerable litigation. The space allotted me does not per-
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mit an extensive discussion of all of such cases, so I shall only
call attention to a few of them.
An early Colorado case dealing with the question of
treble damages was that of Wymond vs. Arnsbury, 2 Colo.
213. A constable had seized certain wearing apparel and certain household goods and was sued for three times the value
thereof. Our Supreme Court in deciding this case uses the
following language: "Defendant in error testified he was the
owner of the goods taken. As to the wearing apparel, this
was probably sufficient, for as to such goods, the ownership
may show the use to which they were applied. But in household goods, such as beds and bedding and the like, the statute
protects only such as are kept for the use of the debtor and his
family, and these must be of certain kinds, which are described, or if of other kinds, not exceeding $100 in value.
The evidence is silent as to the use of the goods by the defendant in error, and his family, and the value of those not enumerated in the statute, points upon which it should be
explicit."
In Klug vs. Corder, 82 Colo. 318; 259 Pac. 613 (the
same case coming again to the Supreme Court and being reported in 15 Pac. (2nd) 621), it was held that a motor
vehicle could, in some cases, dependent upon the nature of its
use, be held exempt as a farm wagon. The facts in this case
being that Corder as sheriff of Weld County had seized a
Buick automobile under writ of execution, and Klug claimed
the same as exempt as a farm wagon and on his demand for
its return being refused, he brought suit for damages in the
sum of approximately $3,500, being three times the value of
the automobile. It was finally determined by the jury that
the automobile, not being used as a farm wagon, was not
exempt.
A reference to the statute will show that in certain cases
property to a certain value is exempt, and on passing some of
these sections it has been held: "Where the debtor only has
the amount, kind and value of property which is exempt, a
levy and sale thereof is illegal unless exemption be waived and
the officer seizing the same is liable for damages to three times
the value of the property." Sanberg vs. Bordstadt, 48 Colo.
96; 109 Pac. 419.
In the case of Duncan vs. Burchinell, 14 C. A. 471; 61
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Pac. 61, the Court in a very lengthy opinion goes into the
respective rights of the debtor and of the officer arising out of
claims for property seized which the debtor claims as exempt,
and I desire to give a few of the points as laid down in this
decision. They are:
(1). Our statutes do not require a debtor to claim exemption if the property be wholly exempt, but where the
officer is not chargeable with knowledge of the debtor's right
to retain specific property and makes levy in good faith, upon
settled principles in order that the duty of returning the property may be cast upon the officer, demand must be made for it.
(2).
Such demand must be made within a reasonable
time and what is a reasonable time must be determined from
the facts and circumstances in each case.
The right to make such demand may be waived,
(3).
and such waiver may be by conduct as well as by words.
(4). If demand is made for the return of the goods
the officer must return the goods within a reasonable time, or
be subject to an action for treble damages, but what is a reasonable time depends upon all of the facts and circumstances
of each case.
I wish to give particularly the facts in the court's decision in brief in the case of Smith vs. Pueblo M. & C. Co. et
al., 260 Pac. 109. The facts were one Thomas, sheriff of
Pueblo County, seized, under writ of attachment, an automobile belonging to Smith. Smith demanded the return of the
auto as exempt property on the grounds that it was a tool in
trade and that he had to use the same as a necessary means of
transportation of himself and his carpenter tools to and from
his work. The sheriff refused to return the property until
the question as to whether or not said property was exempt
was first tried by the court. The issue was then tried and the
property found to be exempt by the court and the automobile
was returned to Smith. He then brought suit against the
sheriff and the Pueblo company, as attaching creditor, for
three times the value of the car. The District Court ruled
against him and on appeal to Supreme Court the following
points were raised by the Pueblo company, defendant in error:
First: That as the property was not specifically made
exempt under the statute and it took a judicial decision to
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decide whether or not the property was exempt that the sheriff could not be held for treble damages. The Supreme Court
held that under the statutes the property having been declared
to be exempt, even though it was not specifically set out in the
statutes as exempt, nevertheless it having been determined to
be exempt the sheriff was liable for treble damages.
Second: It was argued that inasmuch as the sheriff had
a reasonable length of time in which to return the property
and as he only held it until the claim of exemption was tried
in the court and then returned it, he should not be held for
treble damages. The Supreme Court held that whenever an
officer compelled the debtor to go into court to prove the
property exempt that the holding of the property was for an
unreasonable length of time as a matter of law.
I wish also to call your attention to the case of Blum vs.
Kasnik, 90 Colo. 414; 10 Pac. (2nd) 384. The facts in this
case were one Venuti obtained judgment against Kasnik in the
District Court of the City and County of Denver. Execution
on such judgment was issued to Blum, sheriff of Boulder
County, who seized an automobile belonging to Kasnik. Kasnik claimed the auto was exempt as he was using it in selling
Watkins Products and also as a means of transportation as a
coal miner to and from his work. The attorneys for Venuti
then issued a citation upon Kasnik demanding that he appear
before the District Court of Denver at a time certain so that
the question of whether or not said car was exempt could be
tried. Kasnik refused to appear. The Denver District Court
then determined on the evidence introduced by Venuti that
the auto was not exempt and issued an order demanding Blum
to proceed with the sale thereof, which was done. Kasnik
then brought suit against Blum for three times the value of
the car. The court said: "Upon the question of the method
of disposition of claims for exemption the following appears
in 25 C. J. 148, No. 279. 'Express provision is made by
statute in some jurisdictions for the determination of the right
to exemption in a summary manner and the debtor may avail
himself of such remedy without resorting to his ordinary
remedy by action, and on the contrary such a remedy is not
exclusive unless the statute so provides. But in absence of
statute where the facts are not admitted, the court cannot
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assume the prerogative of a jury, and pass upon the debtor's
right to an exemption in a summary manner.' " The net
result of the decision in this case was that Blum, as sheriff, was
held for treble damages.
In the case of Pappas vs. Capps, 263 Pac. 411, being an
action in mandamus to compel the sheriff of Huerfano County
to levy upon an automobile owned by one Kartas, a judgment
debtor. The sheriff refused to make the levy and this action
was brought to compel him to do so. The sheriff's defense
was that the car was exempt and therefore he should not be
compelled to seize the same. The court held that the right of
exemption is a personal privilege that may be asserted or
waived by the judgment debtor and held for the plaintiff and
said that the writ of mandamus should have been issued.
This creates a situation in Colorado which seems to be
serious. The officer must levy upon property whether he
deems it exempt or not, and even if the issue is tried in the
court without the consent of the defendant and the property
is found not to be exempt and the sheriff is ordered to sell the
property, he is liable for treble damages, or in the event he
refuses to return the property on demand and insists that the
issue of exemption be first tried and then returns the property,
in the event the property is found by the court to be exempt,
he is nevertheless liable for treble damages, a situation which
is most unjust to the officers of the law.
From a study of the cases above cited and others such as
(Schwartz vs. Birnbaum, 21 Colo. 21: 39 Pac. 416; Weil
vs. Nevitt, 19 Colo. 10; 31 Pac. 487; Madera vs. Holdrege,
4 C. A. 126; 35 Pac. 52: Note 28 A. L. R., page 74), it
appears very plainly that the question of whether or not
property is exempt is not always an easy one to determine.
Several factors such as the nature of use, value, whether debtor
is living with family, etc., must be taken into consideration in
determining the problem, and to subject an officer to treble
damages in the event of a wrong guess as to the outcome of
the trial of the issue is certainly unfair and unjust.
To correct the situation which has been discussed, a bill
has been introduced in the Legislature, the same being Senate
Bill No. 33 (an identical measure being introduced in the
House as House Bill No. 173). This bill in short provides:

112

DICTA

Where property is seized under writ of execution or
attachment or other order of court, notice of such seizure
must be given to the debtor, the debtor within ten days after
being so served must make claim in the court out of which the
process was issued, his claim of exemption, describing the
property he claims to be exempt with the grounds for such
exemption. Thereupon the issue of whether or not the property is exempt is set down for trial in not less than five or
more than fifteen days. Notice of such trial is served on the
officer either personally or by leaving a copy thereof with his
deputy at his office and upon the plaintiff creditor either personally or by mailing a copy of notice to his attorney of record. The trial of the issue may be continued within the
discretion of the court or Justice of the Peace. If on trial of
the issue the property is found to be exempt, then it is ordered
returned and if the officer returns it within forty-eight hours,
he can only be held for actual damages. If he refuses to return
it for any reason, then he becomes liable for treble damages.
The bill also provides that if the debtor does not make his
claim of exemption within the ten days after being served of
notice of seizure he shall conclusively be deemed to have
waived his right of exemption and has no action against the
officer for damages for seizure.
The bill also provides that where property is seized and
the court finds a portion thereof is exempt and the property
consists of various items which may be divisible the court fixes
the value of each item and requests the defendant to choose
such property as he desires to claim to be exempt up to the
aggregate value of his exemption, the balance being held for
further order of court, or if the property is such that it is not
divisible, then the court may order the property sold and out
of the first proceeds of sale, the debtor is allowed the amount
of his statutory exemption.
This measure will, I believe, correct the situation which
has been discussed in this article, first, by giving to the debtor
a plain, simple remedy where he can make his claim of exemption and have a speedy trial as to whether the same is exempt;
and second, the officers of the law in making seizure of property under process of court in good faith will be protected
against suits for treble damages if the property having been
found to be exempt by the court is returned immediately.

